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ABSTRACT. Subjective probabilities play a central role in many economic decisions, and act as an
immediate confound of inferences about behavior, unless controlled for. Several procedures to
recover subjective probabilities have been proposed, but in order to recover the correct latent
probability one must either construct elicitation mechanisms that control for risk aversion, or
construct elicitation mechanisms which undertake “calibrating adjustments” to elicited reports. We
illustrate how the joint estimation of risk attitudes and subjective probabilities can provide the calibration
adjustments that theory calls for. We illustrate this approach using data from a controlled experiment
with real monetary consequences to the subjects. This allows the observer to make inferences about
the latent subjective probability, under virtually any well-specified model of choice under subjective
risk,  while still employing relatively simple elicitation mechanisms.
JEL codes: C9, C8, D84 
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Subjective probabilities are operationally defined as those probabilities that lead an agent to
choose some prospects over others when outcomes depend on events that are not yet actualized.
These choices could be as natural as placing a bet on a horse race, or as experimentally structured as
responding to the payoff prizes provided by some scoring rule. In order to infer subjective
probabilities from observed choices of this kind, however, one either has to make some strong
assumptions about risk attitudes or jointly estimate risk attitudes and subjective probabilities. We
show how the latter can be implemented by pairing several experimental tasks together, some of
which identify risk attitudes and some of which identify the interplay between risk attitudes and
subjective probabilities. Joint estimation of a structural model of choice across these two types of
tasks allows one to make inferences about subjective probabilities from observed behavior in
relatively simple choice tasks.
The notion that subjective probabilities can be usefully viewed as prices at which one might
trade has been a common one in statistics, and is associated with de Finetti [1937][1970] and Savage
[1971]. It is also clear, of course, in the vast literature on gambling, particularly on the setting of odds
by bookies and parimutuel markets (Epstein [1977; p. 298ff.]). The central insight is that subjective
probabilities of events are marginal rates of substitution between contingent claims, where the
contingencies are events that the probabilities refer to. There are then a myriad of ways in which one
can operationalize this notion of a marginal rate of substitution.1
Scoring rules are procedures that convert a “report” by an individual into a lottery defined
over the outcome of some event.  The formal link between scoring rules and optimizing decisions
by agents is also familiar, particularly in Savage [1971], Kadane and Winkler [1987][1988], Holt
1 For example, one could elicit the p that makes the subject indifferent between a lottery paying M
with probability p and m with probability (1-p), for M>m, and a lottery paying M if the event occurs and m if
it does not (Marschak [1964; p. 107ff.]). This method formally requires that one elicit indifference, which
raises procedural issues that can be avoided by using the type of scoring rules investigated here.
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[1986] and Hanson [2003]. Jose, Nau, and Winkler [2008] explore the relationship between expected
scores, expected utility, and generalized information/entropy measures for several popular scoring
rules and the HARA class of utility functions.  Alternatives to scoring rules include procedures like
those developed for utility elicitation by Becker, DeGroot and Marschak [1964]2 (BDM) and adapted
to eliciting probabilities. Karni [2009], Grether [1992], Köszegi and Rabin [2008], and Holt and
Smith [2009] are examples of this alternative.3  All of these elicitation procedures have some
potential problems. The first is the poor incentive properties around the true subjective belief. This
is particularly the case for BDM procedures where under-reporting leads to very small expected lost
earnings. The second is that explanations to these procedures are not naturally easy to understand
for subjects, such that payoff consequences to various decisions must be made transparent. 
One advantage with the BDM is that the curvature of the utility function does not confound
the elicited probabilities, since the same payoffs can be used in the reference lottery and the actual
lottery.  Under rank dependent utility (RDU), however, one needs to recognize that it is the decision
weights and not the subjective probabilities that are elicited. In the case of scoring rules one could
instead undertake “calibrating adjustments” to the elicited beliefs for non-linear utility functions
and/or probability weighting, as carried out in Offerman, Sonnemans, van de Kuilen and Wakker
[2009; §6].4 Their elegant approach has a reduced form simplicity, and is agnostic about which
structural model of decision making under risk one uses. The maintained assumption, however, is
that any deviation in reports from objective and known probabilities transfers directly to a task
2 See for example Rutström [1998], Harstad [2000], Plott and Zeiler [2005], and Hao and Hauser
[2012] for discussions of properties of BDM. 
3 Let there be two prizes, x>y. The subject reports a probability ξ, and a random number ζ is selected
from the unit interval. If ζ # ξ the subject gets the lottery that pays off x if the event occurs, and y otherwise;
if ζ > ξ the subject gets the lottery that pays off x with probability ζ and y with probability 1-ζ.
4 The need for some correction is also recognized by Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram [1996;
p.824, fn.8] and Rutström and Wilcox [2009; p.11, fn.8].
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where probabilities are subjective, less precise and not known with certainty. While precise and
agnostic about structural assumptions, the method requires the employment of identical tasks and
incentives across the natural lottery for which one wants to elicit subjective beliefs and the
calibration task with known objective probabilities. Our approach is more general in the sense that it
does not require two identical instruments for eliciting the beliefs and the belief calibration function.
Our approach also has the advantage of allowing a structural identification of sources of
imprecision about inferences over subjective probabilities. If inferred subjective probabilities are
conditioned on knowing risk attitudes from earlier tasks, or assuming risk attitudes a priori, then any
behavioral or statistical uncertainty on the calibration should be allowed to “propagate” into some
additional uncertainty over inferences about subjective probabilities. Our joint estimation method
allows these error propagation effects to occur, as theory says they should, providing more reliable
estimates of subjective probabilities, even if those estimates have large standard errors. Reliability
and precision are not the same thing. One can numerically generate a precise estimate based on
maintained assumptions that are false, resulting in an unreliable estimator. In other words, it is
possible that the choice task for eliciting subjective probabilities generates a point response that
appears to be quite precise by itself, but which is actually not a very precise estimate of the latent
subjective probability when one properly accounts for uncertainty over the “calibrated” risk
attitudes.
We are not the first to propose the general idea of joint estimation of subjective probabilities
and utility functions. Viscusi and Evans [1998] introduced the idea in an examination of how
subjects appear to update latent subjective probabilities when told how objective probabilities
change. They estimate subjective posterior probabilities and utility curvatures from stated willingness
to pay for risk reductions in hypothetical surveys, testing whether subjects completely respond to the
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information given or are influenced by prior beliefs.5 Viscusi and Evans [2006] extend this approach
to compare implied subjective probabilities to stated probabilities also observed in hypothetical
survey responses.6 We extend the idea of joint estimation to data derived from incentivized popular
scoring rules for eliciting subjective probabilities and lottery choices, so that there are real monetary
consequences of different reports. Our approach uses the actual incentives provided by these
scoring rules, along with explicit structural models of decision-making under risk, to infer the latent
subjective probabilities that agents employ.7
In section 1 we briefly state the theory underlying our approach and relate this to the
literature on belief elicitation. The properties of the QSR and LSR, and the fact that responses to
these are affected by risk attitudes, are well known. We assume throughout that the agent is acting in
what is called a “probabilistically sophisticated” manner, although our method does not restrict the
characterization of risk attitudes to expected utility theory (EUT), or to specific functional forms.
We also consider the inference of subjective probabilities for subjects who are assumed to make
decisions according to the RDU model. This extension is particularly appropriate in the case of
eliciting subjective probabilities, because it involves allowing for probability weighting and non-
5 Under the assumption that subjects only use information in the survey to form their risk
perceptions (Table 2, p. 30, Case 1), they estimate the subjective risk perception. Evans and Viscusi [1993]
show that respondents to this survey behave as if they are risk neutral in the face of “small” changes in the
risk of using the product. Viscusi and Evans [1990] examine responses to hypothetical surveys of
compensating differentials for “large” subjective job risks, using the same general framework, and show that
their estimates are invariant to whether they assume linear, logarithmic or exponential utility models, implying
that their subjects also behave as if they are risk neutral.
6 They also differentiate between posterior subjective risk probabilities and the “behavioral
probabilities” that agents use when making wage choices conditional on those subjective probabilities. These
behavioral probabilities can differ from subjective probabilities, in exactly the same manner as weighted
probabilities arise in rank-dependent utility models. 
7 There is nothing in the approach of Viscusi and Evans [1998][2006] that requires using hypothetical
survey data. They do require some identifying assumptions about how agents form their posterior risks, and
for that they use a generalized “quasi-Bayesian” learning model with specific distributional assumptions about
the data-generating process for risks. It would be valuable to contrast, in a controlled manner with
experiments using real incentives, the effect of these different approaches to identifying utility functions and
subjective probabilities.
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additive decision weights on the utility of final outcomes. Given that one of the probabilities to be
weighted is the subjective probability being estimated, one might expect estimates of the subjective
probability to be even more sensitive to the correct specification of the model of risk attitudes
employed.
In section 2 we describe the experimental task we posed to 140 subjects, split roughly equally
across the QSR and LSR alternatives. Our subjects made choices over a number of standard
lotteries, characterized by objective uncertainty over monetary outcomes between $0 and $100.  The
lotteries vary both in prizes and in probabilities, allowing us to identify parameters for both utility
functions and probability weighting functions. Subjects also gave responses to either a QSR or LSR
choice task over subjective beliefs. The prizes on each of these scoring rule tasks also spanned $0
and $100, so that we were able to infer risk attitudes over the same prize domain as the scoring rule
responses.
Section 3 formally sets out the econometric model used for estimating subjective
probabilities, spelling out the manner in which we undertake joint estimation over all tasks in order
to identify subjective probabilities. Section 4 then presents our estimates of the inferred subjective
probabilities from these scoring rules, after adjusting for risk. Our primary result is that subjective
probabilities inferred under the assumption of risk neutrality are very different to the subjective
probabilities inferred when one allows the data to say how risk averse the subjects were. This finding
has immediate implications for the practical use of scoring rules,8 which is the focus here; it also has
implications for inferences that can be drawn from prediction markets since experimental findings
8 There is a large, practical literature on the “normative” elicitation of subjective probabilities,
reviewed by O’Hagen et al. [2006] and illustrated well by Shephard and Kirkwood [1994]. One characteristic
of those elicitation procedures is that they involve considerable real-time, one-on-one feedback between the
elicitor and the elicitee, often including results from proper scoring rules. Our approach is to better model
inferences from more static, impersonal applications of those scoring rules, as a prelude to the design and
evaluation of normative elicitation procedures with incentives.
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consistently shows that people are risk averse on average. We offer a methodology for jointly
estimating risk attitudes and subjective probabilities, and show that utility curvature and probability
weighting can have opposing qualitative effects on inferences about subjective probabilities. Section
5 draws conclusions.
1. Scoring Rules
For simplicity we assume throughout that the events in question only have two outcomes. A
scoring rule asks the subject to make some report θ, and then defines how an elicitor pays a subject
depending on their report and the outcome of the event. This framework for eliciting subjective
probabilities can be formally viewed from the perspective of a trading game between two agents: you
give me a report, and I agree to pay you $X if one outcome occurs and $Y if the other outcome
occurs. The scoring rule defines the terms of the exchange quantitatively, explaining  how the elicitor
converts the report from the subject into a lottery. We use the terminology “report” because we
want to view this formally as a mechanism, and do not want to presume that the report is in fact the
subjective probability π of the subject. In general, it is not.
The QSR was apparently first used by McKelvey and Page [1990], and later by Offerman,
Sonnemans and Schram [1996], McDaniel and Rutström [2001], Nyarko and Schotter [2002],
Schotter and Sopher [2003], Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker [2008] and Rutström and Wilcox [2009].9
In each case the subject is implicitly or explicitly assumed to be risk-neutral.10 Scoring rules that are
9 Hanson [1996] contains some important corrections to some of the claims about QSR elicitation in
McKelvey and Page [1990].
10 McKelvey and Page [1990] augmented the scoring rule procedure with a “binary lottery” payment
procedure to induce risk-neutrality. In theory the subject earns “points” in the scoring rule, which convert in a
linear manner into an increased probability of winning some lottery defined over a high prize and a low prize.
There is considerable controversy over the behavioral validity of this procedure, reviewed in Harrison,
Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2013].
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linear in the absolute deviation of the estimate have been used by Dufwenberg and Gneezy [2000], 
and Haruvy, Lahav and Noussair [2007]. Croson [2000] and Hurley and Shogren [2005] used scoring
rules that are linear in the absolute deviation as well as providing a bonus for an exactly correct
prediction.  Scoring rules that provide a positive reward for an “exact” prediction and zero otherwise
have been used by Charness and Dufwenberg [2006]. 
In many cases the inferential objective has been to test hypotheses drawn from
“psychological game theory,” which rest entirely on making operational the beliefs of players in
strategic games. For this purpose, and also in other applications, the elicitation of beliefs is
combined with some other experimental task. Other applications include testing the hypothesis that
the belief elicitation task will encourage players in a game to think more strategically (Croson [2000],
Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker [2008], Rutström and Wilcox [2009]). Of course, combining tasks in
this way violates the “no stakes condition” required for the QSR to elicit beliefs reliably unless one
assumes that the subject is risk neutral (Kadane and Winkler [1988],  Karni and Safra [1995] and
Karni [1999]). Only one of these studies employ a “spectator” treatment in which players are asked
to provide beliefs but do not take part in the constituent game determining the event outcome: study
#2 of Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram [1996].
The popular QSR is defined in terms of two positive parameters, α and β that determine a
fixed reward the subject gets and a penalty for error. Assume that the possible outcomes are A or B,
where B is the complement of A, that θ is the reported probability for A, and that Θ is the true
binary-valued outcome for A. Hence Θ=1 if A occurs, and Θ=0 if it does not occur (and thus B
occurs instead). The subject is paid S(θ|A occurs) = α - β(Θ-θ)2 = α - β(1-θ)2 if event A occurs and
S(θ|B occurs) = α - β(Θ-θ)2 = α - β(0-θ)2 if B occurs. In effect, the score or payment penalizes the
subject by the squared deviation of the report from the true binary-valued outcome, Θ, which is 1
and 0 respectively for A and B occurring. An omniscient seer would obviously set θ= Θ. The fixed
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reward is a convenience to ensure that subjects are willing to play this trading game, and the penalty
function simply accentuates the penalty from not being an omniscient seer. In our experiments α =
β = $100, so subjects could earn up to $100 or as little as $0. If they reported 1 they earned $100 if
event A occurred or $0 if event B occurred; if they reported ¾ they earned $93.75 or $43.75; and if
they reported ½ they earned $75 no matter what event occurred.
It is intuitively obvious, and also well known in the literature (e.g., Winkler and Murphy
[1970] and Kadane and Winkler [1988]), that risk attitudes will affect the incentive to report one’s
subjective probability “truthfully” in the QSR.11 A sufficiently risk averse agent is clearly going to be
drawn to a report of ½, and varying degrees of risk aversion will cause varying distortions in reports
from subjective probabilities. If we knew the form of the (well-behaved) utility function of the
subjects, and their degree of risk aversion, we could infer back from any report what subjective
probability they must have had. Indeed, this is exactly what we do below, recognizing that we only
ever have estimates of their true degree of risk aversion.
The LSR is also defined in terms of two positive parameters, γ and λ, that serve as fixed
rewards and penalties, respectively. The subject is paid a fixed reward less some multiple of the
absolute difference between their report and what actually happened, which is also what an
omniscient seer would have reported. Thus the payment is S(θ|A occurs) = γ - λ(1-θ) if event A
occurs and S(θ|B occurs) = γ - λ(θ-0) if B occurs. We again set γ = λ = $100, generating payoffs of
$100 or $0 for a report of 1; $75 and $25 for a report of ¾; and $50 no matter what the outcome for
a report of ½. The LSR is not a favorite of decision theorists, since a risk neutral subject would jump
11 There exist mechanisms that will elicit subjective probabilities without requiring that one correct
for risk attitudes, such as the procedures proposed by Köszegi and Rabin [2008; p.199], Karni [2009], Grether
[1992], Holt and Smith [2009], Offerman, Sonnemans, van de Kuilen and Wakker [2009] and Hao and Hauser
[2012], discussed further below. The last four employ these mechanisms in an experimental evaluation. We
discussed earlier the difficulties of practical application of these methods.
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to corner-solution reports of 1 or 0 whenever their true beliefs were either side of ½. But when the
subject is (even modestly) risk averse, an interior solution is obtained, and we face the same issues of
inference as with the QSR. The LSR is a favorite of experimental economists because of the
simplicity of explaining the rule: the score for a report and an event is linear in the reported
probability report, so there is no need for elaborate tables showing cryptic payoff scores for discrete
reports.12
In order to avoid portfolio effects from the combined choices rewards in these scoring rule
task are sometimes very, very small. For example, Nyarko and Schotter [2002] and Rutström and
Wilcox [2009] gave each subject an endowment of 10 cents, from which their penalties are to be
deducted. In the latter study this does not present a problem since the focus is not on analyzing the
elicited beliefs but on analyzing the game play as a function of exposing subjects to a belief
elicitation process. Nevertheless, one has to worry about the incentive properties of the elicitation
method once the interest is on analyzing the beliefs themselves. 
The need to calibrate or control for risk aversion is often not made explicit, or is claimed to
be of marginal concern. Schotter and Sopher [2003; p. 504] recognize the role of risk aversion, but
appear to argue that it is not a factor behaviorally:
It can easily be demonstrated that this reward function provides an incentive for
subjects to reveal their true beliefs about the actions of their opponents. Telling the
truth is optimal; however, this is true only if the subjects are risk neutral. Risk
aversion can lead subjects to make a “secure” prediction and place a .50 probability
of each strategy. We see no evidence of this type of behavior.
Of course, evidence of subjects selecting the probability report of ½ only shows that the subject has
12 Hanson [1996; p. 1224] provides a useful reminder that discrete implementations of proper scoring
rules can also engender piecewise linear opportunity sets. He points out that certain regions of the QSR
implemented by McKelvey and Page [1990] were actually LSR, and that risk-neutral subjects would then
rationally report a probability at the extremes of that linear region, and not at the discrete alternative closest to
their true belief.
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extreme risk aversion. The absence of that extreme evidence says nothing about the role that risk
aversion might play in general. Only one QSR study attempts to explicitly calibrate the beliefs for
non-linear utility functions and/or probability weighting: Offerman, Sonnemans, van de Kuilen and
Wakker [2009; §6]. We introduce an alternative experimental method where the decision model can
be identified econometrically from one set of tasks for the same subjects, or even on a different pool
of subjects drawn from the same population, and then statistically integrated with the belief
elicitation task, while transparently allowing error terms to propagate. The estimation of the decision
model over risk and subjective probabilities is joint and simultaneous, even if one can think of the
lottery choices as recursively identifying the decision model.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
2.  Experimental Design
Figure 1 illustrates the lottery choice that our subjects were given. Each subject faced 45
such choices, where prizes spanned the domain $0 up to $100 and probabilities for various prizes
varied across each lottery. One choice was selected to be paid out at random after all choices had
been entered. Choices of indifference were resolved by rolling a die and picking one lottery, as had
been explained to subject. This interface builds on the classic binary choice design of Hey and Orme
[1994], and is discussed in greater detail in Harrison and Rutström [2008; Appendix B]. The lotteries
were presented sequentially in 3 blocks of 15, where each block had prizes in one of three intervals
between $0 and some higher level. One level was between $0 and $1, the other level was between $0
and $10, and the third level was between $0 and $100. We presented the lotteries sequentially so that
the subject could see that all of the lotteries in one block were for a given scale. The sequence of
blocks was randomized across subjects. Complete instructions are provided in Web Appendix A and
the full set of lotteries in Web Appendix D.
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[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
The belief tasks were presented to subjects with a novel interface that has many attractive
features.13 Figure 2 shows the interface for the QSR as it was presented to subjects on a computer
screen and in printed instructions. The interface was explained with instructions which used a trusty
old bingo cage to illustrate one underlying random process. By varying the slider the subject could
choose a report, with the conditional payoffs being displayed. The formula for the scoring rule is not
shown, but the subject instead just sees alternative payoffs for different reports. The subject was
then taken through displays of their payoffs if they chose to report 0% or 100%.14 Each subject
participated in an unpaid training choice, in which they were told the number of orange balls in the
bingo cage that was on public display, and asked to make a report and confirm it. We deliberately
adopted an extremely high scale of a maximum $1000 payoff to ensure that the subjects understood
that this was to be a trainer.
Each subject then participated in 7 belief elicitation tasks, knowing that one would be
selected for payment. The first 3 were repetitions of the training task with orange and white ping
pong balls, but with completely different distributions of orange and white ping pong balls, and
serve to provide subjects with hands-on, incentivized experience in the scoring rule.15 We do not
analyse these choices here. The fourth task was based on the outcomes of a test in psychology for
empathy known as The Eyes Test (e.g., Baron-Cohen [2003]). All subjects had completed this test at
13 This interface immediately extends to other tasks with a cardinal scale that experimental
economists use to elicit risk preferences, discount rates, or social preferences. We opted to use binary choices
for our lottery tasks, to be consistent with the vast bulk of the literature on the elicitation of risk preferences.
14 The display of the probability on the right side of the slider always show an integer percentage, and
the earnings were always calculated on that value, thus making the continuous probability scale into an integer
one. In the statistical analysis we treat the probability as taking on 101 integer values in the range 0 to 100.
15 The subjects were told that there were 60 balls in total in a publicly visible, but initially covered,
bingo cage, but were not told the number of orange or white balls. The urn was uncovered and spun for 10
rotations, and then the subject had to make a report that a ball drawn at random would be orange. Applying
the methods examined here to these data does not change any of our conclusions.
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the outset of the session, and the event they were asked about was whether the score that a
randomly chosen man got on the Eyes Test was equal to or greater than the score that a randomly
chosen woman would get. The final three tasks were based on the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election,
which was to be held about one week after the session. One task was whether the outright winner of
the Presidency would be a Democrat or a Republican, one task was whether the winning share of
the popular vote would be at least 5 percentage points greater than the losing share, and the final
task was whether the winning share of the popular vote would be at least 10 percentage points
greater than the losing share.16 Our own a priori expectations for these subjective probabilities were
just around 50%, around 80%, around 65% and less than 10%, respectively. 
The events were explained in written instructions, which were also read out loud. The event
based on the Eyes Test was explained as follows: “We will pick one man and one woman in the
room. Do you think the man who is selected will have a higher score on the Eyes Test than the
woman who is selected?” We then explained how we would randomly select one man and one
woman in the session and compare their scores. They were then asked to bet on: “That the man we
select at random will have a higher score on the Eyes Test than the woman we select at random.”
After subjects had completed their bets on the bingo cage and Eyes Test tasks, the final
three events, about the Presidential Elections, included the following three bets: 
1. Will the next President of the United States be a Democrat? 
2. Will the popular vote for the winning candidate be 5 or more percentage points
greater than the popular vote for the losing candidate? 
3.  Will the popular vote for the winning candidate be 10 or more percentage points greater
16 These events compare to similar events employed in popular prediction markets, inspired by
Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright [1992]. See http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/ for the current version
of this market, and the contracts traded in the 2008 Presidential Election.
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than the popular vote for the losing candidate?
We explained that the first question was about the outcome of the Electoral College vote, and not
the popular vote, and that for the second and third question, we were asking if they thought that the
winner of the popular vote would beat the loser by 5 or 10 percentage points or more. The subjects
then completed their belief elicitation tasks for these Presidential election events, and went on to the
lottery choice tasks described earlier.
We recruited 140 subjects from the student population of the University of Central Florida,
split equally across the QSR and LSR treatments. The experiments were conducted in the week prior
to the 2008 election, Monday October 27 through Friday October 31. Our 140 subjects earned
about $90 on average for the two paid tasks. Each session lasted around 1½ to 2 hours, and never
more than 2 hours. There was considerable variation in earnings, with one subject taking home $3
and another subject taking home $205.
3. Econometric Model
We develop the econometric model to be estimated in three stages, with details presented in
Web Appendix C. First we specify risk attitudes assuming an EUT model of latent choice, where the
focus is entirely on the concavity of the estimated utility function. Second, we specify risk attitudes
assuming a RDU model of latent choice, so that risk attitudes are determined by the interplay of
concave utility functions and non-linear probability weighting.17 Third, we consider the joint
estimation of risk attitudes and subjective probability, using either the EUT or the RDU
specification.
17 We could just develop an RDU model and test if the estimated probability weighting is the identity
function, in which case the RDU model collapses to an EUT model.  However, the exposition is, in our view,
simpler if one develops the models separately because of the familiarity of EUT to most economists.
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3.1 Estimating the EUT and RDU Models
We assume an Expo-Power (EP) utility function originally proposed by Saha [1993].
Following Holt and Laury [2002], the EP function is defined as
u(y) = [1-exp(-αy1-r)]/α, (1)
where α and r are parameters to be estimated, and y is income from the experimental choice. The EP
function can exhibit increasing or decreasing relative risk aversion (RRA), depending on the
parameter α: RRA is defined by r + α(1-r)y1-r, so RRA varies with income if α … 0 and the estimate of
r defines RRA at a zero income. This function nests CRRA (as α 6 0) and CARA (as r  6 0). The
functional form of utility employed here is of no importance, and any monotonic increasing
function of u(.) could have been implemented. We can identify both of these parameters because of
the variation in prizes that are included in the full lottery design, as shown in Web Appendix D.
The RDU model extends the EUT model by allowing for decision weights on lottery
outcomes. We use the same utility function specification (1), but allow for decision weights
generated by a probability weighting function. We adopt the simple “power” probability weighting
function proposed by Quiggin [1982], with curvature parameter γ:
ω(p) = pγ (2)
So γ…1 is consistent with a deviation from the conventional EUT representation.18 Any other
functional form could have been used, as long as the probability function maps the probability p =
[0,1] into the unit interval [0,1] and the function is strictly increasing in p.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
18 We compared our results to estimations based on the inverse-S shaped funtion,  popularized by
Tversky and Kahneman [1992] and the flexible Prelec [1998] function that allows a variety of shapes including
concave, convex, S-shaped and inverse S-shaped. We conclude that the power function fits better for these
data. It has a better log-likelihood, and it rejects a linear probability weighting function. The shape is
confirmed in our estimates of the flexible Prelec function, while the inverse-S function is close to linear,
which is the best it can do to proxy a power function. 
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Figure 3 shows the manner in which the parameter γ characterizes the probability weighting
function and the decisions weights used to evaluate lottery choices, when the outcomes are ranked
from best to worst. Since we assume γ=0.77<1 in this illustration, to anticipate our estimates, the
probability weighting function ω(p) is. For simplicity here we assume lotteries with 2, 3 or 4 prizes
that are equally likely when we generate the decision weights. So for the case of 2 prizes, each prize
has p=½; with 3 prizes, each prize has p=a; and with 4 prizes, each prize has p=¼. We see the
usual result, that the decision weights on the largest prizes are relatively greater than the true
probability, and the decision weights on the smallest prizes are relatively smaller than the true
probability, reflecting optimism over the outcomes.19
Each panel in Figure 3 is important for our analysis. For the purposes of estimating γ from
the observed lottery choices with known probabilities we only need the decision weights in the right
panel of Figure 3. But for the purposes of recovering a subjective probability π subject to probability
weighting, as distinct from p, the induced objective probability, we instead only need the probability
weighting function. In fact, we need it’s inverse function, since it is the π in the ω(π) function that we
are seeking to recover in that case. We do not directly observe ω(p) or ω(π), but we can estimate ω(@)
as part of the latent structure generating the observed choices in the two types of task, implicitly
assuming that ω(p) = ω(π). To anticipate slightly the exposition below, once we have ω(@) we can
then recover π by directly applying the estimated probability weighting function, such as the one
shown, for a typical γ, in the left panel of Figure 3.20
19 Hence a concave probability weighting function, as in the left panel of Figure 3, implies risk-
seeking behavior, ceteris paribus the curvature of the utility function.
20 There is a caveat to this intuition when subjective probabilities are close to 0.5, due to a jump
discontinuity in decision weights as reports under the QSR vary around 0.5. At the point where the report is
0.5 the rank ordering of the choice options reverses. For reports less than 0.5 the A option implies higher
monetary rewards, but for reports greater than 0.5 it is the B option that offers the higher reward. For
sufficiently large probability weighting this jump discontinuity can wreak havoc with the ability to infer latent
subjective probabilities. In our applications the probability weighting is not severe, and we can initialize the
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3.2. Estimating the Subjective Probability
To estimate the subjective probability π that each subject holds from LSR or QSR responses
we have to assume something about how they make decisions under risk. This is obvious in theory,
and the only issue then is how to operationalize that property of these scoring rules.
If they are assumed to be risk neutral, then we can directly infer the subjective probability
from the report of the subject.21 This result is immediate under the QSR, but raises a problem of
interpretation under the LSR if the reports are not at the corner solutions of 0% and 100%. On the
other hand, any minimal level of risk aversion will suffice, under the LSR, to generate interior
responses, so we assume that the subjects indeed have some minimal level of risk aversion when we
report “risk neutral subjective beliefs” for the LSR.
Moving to the models that allow for varying risk attitudes, we jointly estimate the subjective
probability and the parameters of the core model. Assume for the moment that we have an EUT
specification. The subject that selects report θ from a given scoring rule receives the following EU
EUθ =      πA  × u(payout if A occurs | report θ) +
         (1-πA) × u(payout if B occurs | report θ) (3)
where πA is the subjective probability that A will occur. The payouts that enter the utility function are
defined by the scoring rule and of course the specific report θ, and span the interval [$0, $100]. For
the QSR and a report of 75%, for example, we have
EU75% = πA × u($93.75) + (1-πA) × u($43.75) (3N)
For the LSR, and the same report, we have:
EU75% = πA × u($75) + (1-πA) × u($25) (3O)
maximum likelihood estimation at the solution values obtained by assuming EUT (so that directional
derivatives do not need to be numerically evaluated in the problematic regions of γ and π).
21 The expression “risk neutral” here should be understood to include the curvature of the utility
function and the curvature of the probability weighting function. So it is not just a statement about the former,
unless one assumes EUT.
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and so on for other possible reports. We observe the report made by the subject for QSR or LSR.
This report can take 101 different integer values defined over percentage points. Then we can
calculate the likelihood of that choice given values of r, πA and μ, where the likelihood is the
multinomial analogue of the binary logit specification used for lottery choices. We define
euΘ = exp[(EUΘ/ν)/μ] (4)
for any report Θ,where μ is a Fechner error and ν is a contextual utility transformation, both
discussed in Web Appendix C, and then
LEU = euθ/(eu0% + eu1% + ÿ + eu100%) (5)
for the specific report θ observed, analogously to the comparable expression for EUT or RDU.
We need r and α to evaluate the utility function in (3), we need πA to calculate the EUθ in (3)
for each possible report Θ in {0%, 1%, 2%, ÿ, 100% }once we know the utility values, and we need μ
to calculate the latent indices (4) and (5) that generate the subjective probability of observing the
choice of specific report θ when we allow for some noise in that process. The joint maximum
likelihood problem is to find the values of these four parameters that best explain observed choices
in the belief elicitation tasks as well as in the lottery tasks. We estimate these parameters
simultaneously, even if the lottery tasks could be used solely to estimate the r and α parameters, and
are needed to ensure identification of all parameters.
Exactly the same logic extends to the model in which we assume an RDU latent structure
instead of an EUT latent structure. In effect, the lottery task allows us to identify r and α under
EUT, and r, α and γ under RDU, thanks to the variations in both prizes and probabilities in this task.
Individual heterogeneity is allowed for by estimating both risk attitudes and subjective probabilities
as linear functions of the demographic characteristics defined earlier.
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4. Results
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
4.1. Raw Elicited Beliefs
Figure 4 displays the raw responses from each of the scoring rules for each event, in the
form of kernel densities, and Table 1 shows summary statistics of the elicited responses. The four
events are the “Eyes Test,” the “President,” “win by 5%,” and “win by 10%.” The summary
statistics suggest that the QSR and LSR provided roughly the same responses, but the densities in
Figure 4 do have some differences in shape. In part this simply alerts us to be aware of the non-
Gaussian shape of these distributions.
The general location of the densities corresponds with our qualitative priors
 on the subjective beliefs that were to be expected for these events. Recall that the Eyes Test asked
for the probability that a typical male would score better than a typical female. For the Eyes Test it
appears, from the observation that the modal response is around 0.4 for both LSR and QSR
treatments, that the sample did not expect the male score to exceed the female score, but that there
was a wide variability around this modal belief.  The sample appeared confident that Barack Obama
would indeed win the election outright, but displayed a healthy sense of perspective on what the
winning margin would be. For our purposes, the choices of a 5% and 10% threshold for the popular
vote could not have worked out better, with a majority believing that a 5% margin would be attained
but that a 10% margin would not. These results show, at a minimum, that responses were at least
correlated with what we believe to be reasonably coherent subjective beliefs for these events.
The fact that the responses to the LSR are not at “corner” values of 0 or 1 shows that the
subjects were not exactly risk neutral. But it does not show much more, because one would observe
some interior response even for small amounts of risk aversion, as noted earlier.
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With the exception of the bets on the outright winner of the Presidential election, the
distribution of responses for the two scoring rules are roughly the same. This conclusion is
supported by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the null hypothesis that the two distributions are equal.
The exception is the case of the outright winner event, where the p-value is only 0.011, so we can
reject that hypothesis in this instance. This finding provides some support for those that would
prefer to use the LSR on the grounds that it is simpler to explain to subjects than the QSR. Of
course, the real issue is whether they generate the same estimates of subjective probability when one
allows for risk attitudes.
4.2. Characterizing Risk Attitudes
Looking just at the lottery choices under a maintained hypothesis of EUT for now, we find
evidence of modest risk aversion at low stakes (since r=0.3>0, and r defines RRA at y=0), and
evidence of slightly increasing relative risk aversion as the prizes climb to $100 (since α=0.03>0).
Detailed results are provided in Web Appendix B, since they are only of indirect interest here. Given
these parameter estimates we can calculate RRA at various prize levels: at $25, $50, $75 and $100 the
RRA is estimated to be 0.49, 0.61, 0.71 and 0.81, respectively.22 Thus, despite the relatively low
estimate of α the implied risk aversion at higher stakes is  much stronger than for the lower stakes.
When we allow for an array of covariates to better characterize the heterogeneity of risk
attitudes, we observe females to be significantly more risk averse, with RRA 0.14 higher at the $0
level. As expected, allowing for covariates has no significant average effect on the RRA by prize
level.
These results suggest that one might see somewhat different effects of “risk-conditioning” in
22 We simply use the estimated model to predict the point estimate of the RRA for each subject and
each of these prizes, and report the average of those RRA point estimates here.
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the reports for scoring rules depending on the stakes involved. Our stakes are large in relation to the
literature: a maximum prize of $100, compared to common implementations in experiments of a
maximum prize of less than $1.23 In applications where the interest is directly on eliciting beliefs,
such small stakes will not generally result in precise estimates, so larger stakes are necessary. Our
results on risk attitudes for low stakes and high stakes imply that the extent of adjustment for risk
attitudes is much greater for higher stake elicitations. It is a factor for both, since we estimate RRA
to be positive for the lowest stakes, but it is not as serious a factor as when the stakes are lower.
The results from estimating the RDU model are slightly different. Detailed estimates are
again reported in Web Appendix B. The estimates of the utility function parameters ŕ and ά are both
larger than their counterparts (r and α) under EUT, implying greater concavity of the utility function.
We estimate the probability weighting parameter under RDU to be γ=0.72 without covariates, and
can reject the hypothesis that this is equal to 1 (p-value<0.001). A likelihood ratio test of the
hypothesis that the EUT model and the RDU model are the same when there are no covariates has a
χ21 = 35.47 (p-value<0.01), so we reject that null. The same conclusion is true when we account for
covariates and heterogeneity of responses. There are no strikingly different coefficient estimates due
to demographic characteristics (even female is not significant here), and the small changes across the
board do not add up to a statistically significant difference. A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis
that the EUT model and the RDU model are the same when including covariates has a χ214 = 47.71
(p-value<0.01). Thus, we find support for the hypothesis of probability weighting in this case,
although here we are not investigating to what extent this is generally true or just holds for portions
of our subjects and/or tasks. Since the estimated γ is less than 1, we conclude that subjects are
23 To be fair, those low-stake implementations are often in the context of the probability elicitation
task being paired with another task, such as the choice of a strategy in a game, and the stake for the
probability elicitation task is kept small to avoid the subject attempting to construct a portfolio of paired
responses across the two tasks. 
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optimistic (or, which is the same, risk seeing), which explains why the utility function is more
concave than for EUT when estimated on the same choice data.
One noteworthy feature of these estimates is that one can reject the CRRA specification for
both EUT and RDU models in this case. Of course, one might accept CRRA if estimating risk
attitudes over a much smaller income domain, such as between $0 and $10, or when the variation in
stakes as a percentage is relatively small.
4.3. Estimating Subjective Probabilities
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Table 2 lists the main results from estimating subjective probabilities for each of the four
events considered here, and assuming either an EUT or RDU specification. We pool data over LSR
and QSR, and control for the effect of the scoring rule with a binary dummy variable.
Assume the EUT specification for now. Given that we find evidence of risk aversion in our
subjects over the domain of prizes used in the belief elicitation tasks, our estimated subjective
probabilities are all translations of the raw responses away from the 50% response. In both the LSR
and QSR we expect risk averse subjects to make choices biased towards 50%, so that when we
correct for their risk attitudes the inferred probabilities should move away from 50%. The reason,
again, is that risk averse subjects are drawn to respond toward 50% simply to reduce the uncertainty
over payoffs, so evidence of risk aversion implies that their true, latent, subjective probabilities must
be further away from 50% than their raw responses. Our maximum likelihood estimates simply
impose some parametric structure on that theoretical structure, to be able to quantify the extent of
the required translation and the precision of the resulting inference about the latent subjective
probability.
For the RDU specification, where we find a stronger concavity of the utility function and
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therefore a stronger effect moving the report closer to the 50% point, there is also an opposite effect
moving the report away from the 50% point due to the concavity of the probability function. Our
results demonstrate that the net effect of these two forces varies with the closeness to the 50%
point. The closer we are to a true, latent subjective probability of 50% the smaller is the utility
correction effect but the stronger is the decision weight correction effect.24 
For the Eyes Test, we observe a very small movement in subjective probabilities away from
the raw responses under the assumption of EUT.  For any given utility curvature, the closer the true
subjective probabilities are to 50% the smaller is the absolute bias generated by the tendency for
aversion to outcome variability to move reports towards 50%. The effect of probability weighting in
the RDU model is statistically significant, and the net effect of probability weighting and utility
curvature is to further adjust the inferred probabilities away from the 50% responses. However, the
net effect masks the fact that there are two underlying forces moving in opposite direction.
Correcting for probability weighting will increase the estimated probability, while correcting for utility
curvature will decrease the estimated probability. The reason that the estimated probability increases
when correcting for probability weighting in this case is because the report we ask subjects to make
is for what they perceive as the unlikely event, with a latent subjective probability less than 0.5. The
scoring rule pays a lower prize for the unlikely event, and with optimistic probability weighting the
worse outcome has a decision weight that understates the subjective belief. The estimated value of
the probability weighting parameter for the Eyes test is γ=0.77, which is the value used to generate
the illustration in Figure 3. Notice also that the closer we are to reports of 50% the larger is the
24 The magnitude of the probability weighting correction close to 50% is a function of the use of a
power function. We also estimated the inverse-S probability weighting function proposed by Tversky and
Kahneman [1992] as well as a flexible Prelec [1998] function. The inverse-S function has both concave and
convex portions and our estimates move this function as close to the everywhere-concave range as is possible,
but with a much lower log likelihood than the power function. The flexible Prelec function is estimated to be
concave. We therefore report results only for the power function.
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probability weighting effect on the report. The strong decrease in the latent probability due to utility
curvature is because the estimated utility curvature is so much stronger under RDU than under
EUT. The 95% confidence interval does not include the raw report for this test under RDU, but
does under EUT.
For the three election events, we see more interesting effects of adjusting for risk aversion.
In the “win by 5%” event, which is again one in which the raw responses are relatively close to 50%,
we again infer a small translation from the raw response average of 59% to 62% under EUT, and
from 59% to 57% under RDU. Because we are now on the opposite side of the 50% divide, the
utility correction will increase the latent probability, while the decision weight correction will cause it
to decrease. The other two election events, on the other hand, illustrate when one might expect to
see the effect of utility curvature exert a more significant quantitative effect because we are further
away from the 50% point, and the spread in the payoffs is larger. On the other hand, we expect a
smaller effect from decision weight corrections since we are closer to the tails of the cumulative
distributions shown in Figure 3, and hence closer to the fixed points ω(π) = π when π is equal to 0 or
1. In the case of the outright winner event, labeled “President” in Table 2, we estimate latent
subjective probabilities to be 80% (EUT) or 87% (RDU), rather than the raw response average of
71%. Moreover, the 95% confidence interval on these estimates does not include the raw response.
Similarly, in the case of the chance of the popular vote for the winner being more than 10% of the
popular vote of the loser, we estimate subjective probabilities of 18% (EUT) or 0.4% (RDU), rather
than the raw response average of 28%.
It is possible to estimate the structural model of risk attitudes and subjective beliefs allowing
for observable covariates on each parameter. To illustrate, Table B3 in Appendix B lists detailed
-25-
EUT estimates for the model of the “win by 5%” event when we include covariates.25 One reason
for controlling for covariates is to allow for sample composition differences between treatments.26
We observe no statistically significant effect from using the QSR or LSR for this event, but there is
no reason to expect one after we properly condition for risk attitudes. That is, the two scoring rules simply
provide subjects with different lotteries with which to place bets about their subjective beliefs. So
the same subjective belief should be estimated from each treatment, once one has conditioned on
risk attitudes. We find a significant difference between QSR and LSR only for the event “win by
10%”, which generates higher probability estimates in the LSR. 
To put these results into perspective, particularly those for the outright winner, it is
important to note that in the week of the experiments the tide of public opinion clearly favored
Barack Obama to win in a landslide. Eliciting a raw belief of only a 70% chance of Obama winning
is therefore puzzling, and an a priori challenge for those that would use the raw results from a QSR
or LSR procedure. For example, consider the Iowa Presidential Market, the current version of the
prediction market developed by Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann and Wright [1992]. Average daily
prices on this market for the month of October 2008, and specifically the week in which our
experiments were conducted,  implied that the market probability of Obama winning was around
85%. Moreover, this was the prevailing sense of the market for at least 2 weeks prior to our
25 The estimates for the subjective probability π refer to a non-linear transform in which we actually
estimate the parameter κ and then convert κ to π using π = 1/(1+exp(κ)). Thus κ can vary between ±4 and π
is constrained to the open unit interval. To interpret these coefficients, κ=0 implies π=½, κ>0 implies π<½,
and κ<0 implies π>½. The estimated subjective probabilities we report have been converted back from κ to π
using this non-linear function and the “delta method” to correctly calculate standard errors (Oehlert [1992]).
In addition, it is the linear function of κ that is constrained by this transform to be in the unit interval, not
each element of that function. Thus, in Table B3 the constant term for π has a statistically significant
coefficient of -0.7, which would violate that constraint if there were no covariates.
26 For example, men and women might have different risk attitudes or subjective beliefs, and the mix
of men and women could vary from treatment to treatment. This can occur even with randomization to
treatment, particularly when considering a wide range of covariates.
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experiments.27 Indeed, the online Irish betting house, PaddyPower.com, was already paying out on
over €1 million in pro-Obama bets as early as October 17! However, calibrating these inferred
market probabilities to reflect the fact that most populations are risk averse on average would imply
an even higher subjective probability.28 
The prices from the Iowa Presidential Market on the popular vote share suggested that a
10% difference was possible. On the other hand, one striking feature of the two contracts,  the
“winner take all” contract and the “popular vote share” contract, is that the latter was poorly traded
in comparison to the former as measured by volume. Of course, that could reflect a market that has
found an equilibrium price, but it also could reflect a market in which there is too much uncertainty
about the outcome for traders to feel safe making a bet. Additionally, correcting for the risk
preferences of the average market participant would imply a much lower probability, consistent
again with what we report here.
5. Conclusions
We demonstrate how one can apply the theory of subjective probability elicitation by means
of scoring rules. Our experimental design shows how one can pair different types of choice tasks to
allow estimation of risk attitudes, which can then be used to condition the inferences from responses
to the scoring rule tasks. Our method involves two simple types of choice tasks that allow us to
identify not just the curvature of utility but also of probability weighting, and to control for these
when inferring subjective beliefs.  Our structural econometric model shows how maximum
27 And the same was true generally, and consistently, for 9 months prior to the 2012 Presidential
election, even if the popular vote was relatively close.
28 Fountain and Harrison [2011] examine many ways on which averages or medians from prediction
markets might not reflect the average or median of the aggregate distribution of beliefs, apart from
heterogeneity of risk attitudes.
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likelihood methods can then be used to estimate subjective probabilities while properly controlling
for both the heterogeneous risk attitudes and for the statistical errors of the latter. We applied this
approach to elicit subjective probabilities over four naturally occurring events from a sample of 140
subjects. We find that it is important to correct for risk attitudes both through the utility curvature
and probability curvature. For this data we find that both utility functions and probability functions
are concave, so that the corrections of probability reports work in opposite directions, at least for
likely events. In addition, the magnitude of the utility correction is smallest close to 50%, while this
is where the magnitude of the probability correction is the strongest. Once we correct for risk
attitudes using our joint estimation approach we find no consistent significant difference between
the Quadratic and Linear Scoring rules. This makes the Linear Scoring rule appealing due to the
simplicity of explaining it to subjects.
Our results show that one has to be sensitive to the risk attitudes of subjects before drawing
inferences about subjective probabilities from responses to scoring rules. One cannot just directly
treat the responses to the scoring rule as if it is a subjective probability, unless one is willing a priori
to make striking assumptions about risk attitudes. Those assumptions are rejected in our data.
Quite apart from inferring the correct point estimate of subjective probability, uncertainty
about risk attitudes affects the confidence that one should have in any point estimate. Even if
subjects are “approximately risk neutral” on average, and the QSR is used, uncertainty about the
precise level of risk attitudes should be properly reflected in uncertainty about inferences over
subjective probabilities. Our analysis has demonstrated how to combine theory and econometrics to
do just that. The choice task for eliciting subjective probabilities generates a point response that
might appear to be quite precise by itself, but which is actually not a very precise estimate of the
latent subjective probability when one properly accounts for uncertainty over risk attitudes.
Of course, although the estimation of subjective probabilities is an important objective in
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itself, the issue of how to best characterize subjective uncertainty, and attitudes towards it, involve
deeper issues. Our estimation approach is clearly within the conventional Bayesian subjective
probability framework of Savage [1971][1972]. That framework provides one obvious point of
departure for criticisms of EUT based on ideas that subjective beliefs should not be represented by
subjective probabilities. Exactly how one then models subjective beliefs is an open and important area
of research (e.g., Smith [1969], Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989], Ghirardoto, Maccheroni and
Marinacci [2004], Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [2005], Nau [2007] and Gilboa, Postlewaite and
Schmeidler [2008]). Further, it seems plausible that subjects exhibit some degree of “uncertainty
aversion” in addition to traditional risk aversion when faced with making decisions about events that
involve subjective probabilities rather than objective probabilities. We leave these issues to future
research.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Scoring Rule Responses
Event Scoring Rule Mean Median Standard Deviation
Eyes Test Quadratic 0.43 0.4 0.19
Linear 0.43 0.4 0.19
Both 0.43 0.4 0.19
President Quadratic 0.69 0.7 0.2
Linear 0.74 0.75 0.22
Both 0.71 0.7 0.21
Win by 5% Quadratic 0.59 0.6 0.23
Linear 0.58 0.6 0.26
Both 0.59 0.6 0.24
Win by 10% Quadratic 0.28 0.3 0.2
Linear 0.29 0.26 0.21
Both 0.28 0.3 0.21
Table 2: Estimated Subjective Probabilities
Event
Specification
(Log-Likelihood)
Point
Estimate
Standard Error or
Standard Deviation
95% Confidence
Interval
Eyes Test EUT (-4563.2) 0.42 0.022 0.38/0.46
RDU (-4550.6) 0.31 0.037 0.24/0.39
Raw Responses 0.43 0.19 0/0.95
President EUT (-4558.1) 0.8 0.033 0.74/0.87
RDU (-4542.1) 0.87 0.079 0.72/1
Raw Responses 0.71 0.21 0.20/1
Win by 5% EUT (-4593.8) 0.62 0.030 0.56/0.68
RDU (-4580.3) 0.57 0.048 0.47/0.67
Raw Responses 0.59 0.24 0.10/1
Win by 10% EUT (-4560.9) 0.18 0.038 0.11/0.25
RDU (-4539.5) 0.004 0.024 0/0.05
Raw Responses 0.28 0.2 0/0.77
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Figure 1: Illustrative Lottery Choice
Figure 2: Illustrative Quadratic Scoring Rule Interface
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Figure 3: Probability Weighting and Decision Weights
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Figure 4: Elicited Responses from QSR and LSR
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